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INTRODUCTION
The Lorenzo is an upscale, Italian-themed apartment
and retail complex near the University of Southern California.1
Primarily marketed to USC students and young professionals,
the Lorenzo lures prospective tenants with its indoor
basketball courts, stadium-seating movie theater, three-story
fitness center, climbing wall, and on-site café.2 However, what
visitors will not see in this $250 million apartment complex is
that the on-site community medical clinic will operate rent-free
for the next twenty years.3 Also missing from the list of
amenities are the funds that the developer earmarked for job
training, local construction workers, and nearby small
businesses, as well as the low-income-housing community trust
created during the land use negotiation process.4 These unseen
features are part of the Community Benefits Agreement (CBA)
negotiated between a South Los Angeles community coalition—
United Neighbors in Defense Against Displacement
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1
Patrick J. McDonnell, City Planners Approve $250-million ResidentialRetail Complex in South L.A., L.A. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/
2011/feb/11/local/la-me-lorenzo-development-20110211.
2
LORENZO, http://www.thelorenzo.com/amenities (last visited Sept. 21, 2012).
3
Diana Pei Wu, Los Angeles Coalition Wins Health Clinic and Jobs from
Developer, 18 RACE, POVERTY, & ENV’T 38, 38-41 (2011).
4
Id.
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(UNIDAD)—and the Lorenzo’s developer, Geoffrey Palmer.5
This agreement accomplished many things: affected community
members were able to participate in the development’s
planning; the developer was able to build community support
for the project and avoid costly litigation; and the municipality
was able to tailor land use development to better accommodate
the interests of all stakeholders.6
CBAs have proliferated as part of a larger movement
throughout the United States away from the unilateral,
government-dominated model of land use regulation and
toward a more negotiated paradigm.7 This now-predominant
model of negotiated decision making, however, has primarily
been bilateral, allowing extensive and unparalleled
opportunities for developers to engage in negotiation with
government regulators but limiting participation opportunities
for other affected parties, such as local residents and small
businesses. In contrast to this prevailing bilateral model, CBAs
allow a wide array of interested parties to participate in the
decision-making process.8 Some developers and municipalities
have recognized that utilizing CBAs can avert or mitigate the
negative effects development will have on a community, reduce
conflict, promote civic engagement, and create community buyin and goodwill toward a new project.9
Although CBAs have emerged in part to address issues
found in the bilateral, negotiated-development model,
unfortunately they have been accompanied by significant
problems of their own.10 Most notably, concerns such as whether
to engage in a CBA process, the appropriate framework for its
negotiation, and its relationship to the public regulatoryapproval process are typically left to the discretion of the
developer. As a result, such agreements typically develop in
parallel to the public process but independently of it—a
redundancy that leads to additional costs for both developers and
community members. More importantly, the negotiation process
5

Id.; Annie Lainer Marquit, Commentary, Public Counsel: Community
Development Lawyers Building Foundations for Healthy Communities, 21 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 9, 15 (2012).
6
Pei Wu, supra note 3, at 40-41.
7
See infra Part I.
8
See infra Part II.
9
JULIAN GROSS ET AL., COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS: MAKING
DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS
ACCOUNTABLE
21-22
(2005),
available
at
http://www.forworkingfamilies.org/resources/publications/community-benefits-agreementsmaking-development-projects-accountable.
10
See id. at 22-23.
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results in less-than-optimal agreements that disproportionately
reflect the interests of the developer, since it is entirely up to the
developer how much to involve other stakeholders.
These weaknesses of CBAs, however, reflect the
continued inadequacy of the existing bilateral-negotiation
process in providing for legitimate land use decisions. The
existing bilateral paradigm could be improved by altering the
public regulatory process to require integration of more
meaningful
and
sustained
stakeholder
participation
opportunities—akin to those provided by CBAs—thereby
reorienting the governmental authority to serve as mediator
rather than negotiator of land use conflict. These improvements
could allow states to stimulate democratic participation,
minimize the costs that accompany separate public and private
negotiations, and promote land use decisions that better reflect
the interests of all affected parties. Such a multilateral model
would help produce decisions that are better planned and more
efficient, fair, and democratic.
This essay proceeds in three sections. Part I outlines the
modern public land use decision-making process’s transition
from a unilateral model to bilateral-negotiation model, while
Part II discusses the rise of CBAs as a response to
shortcomings of the bilateral process. Part II also analyzes
CBAs’ benefits and drawbacks, and Part III suggests how
elements of the CBA process can be integrated into a more
effective negotiating model. In particular, rather than
encouraging the creation of CBAs in the land use negotiation
process, local governments should seek to integrate the most
successful elements of the CBA process into the existing
bilateral-negotiation framework, creating a multilateral,
community-oriented decision-making process.
I.

EVOLUTION TOWARD NEGOTIATED PUBLIC LAND USE
REGULATION

Public land use regulation in the United States was
initially premised on a unilateral, “command-and-control”
model of regulation, akin to the classic “New Deal” model of
administrative regulatory authority that bases its legitimacy
on regulator expertise.11 This model viewed local planning
11

Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 440-41, 446 (2003) (describing New Deal model of regulatory
management by experts “[g]uided by experience and professional discipline”).
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agencies as experts charged with developing the land use rules
and decisions for their jurisdiction.12 Zoning regulations were
expected to be detailed, prospective, and generally applicable
rules that regulators with limited public involvement
established and local expert planners and planning
commissions administered.13 Changes to or deviations from
these general rules were expected to be rare.
Unsurprisingly, it quickly became clear that this model
failed to produce enduring land use rules and led to the rise of
various negotiation-based approaches. Two key problems with
this unilateral model were its reliance on planning expertise
purportedly capable of conceiving objective rules, as well as an
assumption of comprehensive rationality despite substantial
uncertainty.14 In practice, land was frequently designated for
uses that were not deemed economically desirable or feasible,
and land use rules were often used to exclude and discriminate
against persons viewed as undesirable.15
Criticisms of this normative model soon gave rise to
widespread reliance on a suite of bilateral, negotiation-based
approaches. The two most basic variations of this bilateralnegotiation model are negotiated zoning and development and
annexation agreements. Negotiated zoning remains closely tied
to the traditional unilateral approach of land use regulation.
This model accepts the existing command-and-control land use
plan, but it also employs a number of flexibility devices that
allow piecemeal exceptions to existing zoning regulations,
including conditional use permits, variances, planned unit
developments, and contract zoning.16 Under this model, a
developer negotiates with the local government for changes to
the property’s zoning designation, keeping in mind that takings
law requires negotiated conditions to be limited to reducing
impacts caused by zoning changes.17 Consequently, while this
model allows some deviation from the existing zoning

12

Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A
Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive
Planning in Land Use Decisions (Installment I), 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 9 (2005)
[hereinafter Camacho, Mustering I].
13
Id. at 8.
14
Id. at 13-15.
15
See, e.g., JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 6,
15 (1961).
16
Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 12, at 39.
17
See 2 ANDERSON’S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 9.20, at 171 (Kenneth H.
Young ed., 4th ed. 1996); see also infra note 112 and accompanying text.
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framework, its negotiation process and permissible revisions
are somewhat limited.18
Development agreements and annexation agreements,
on the other hand, permit more negotiation and greater
deviation from existing land use designations.19 Once a state passes
enabling legislation that authorizes such agreements—over sixteen
states have done this to date—cities are free to adopt development
agreements or annexation agreements as amendments to traditional
zoning regulations.20 Development agreements are express contracts
in which a developer, before beginning a project, seeks a long-term
change or freeze of rules applicable to the property in question.21 In
California, virtually all large-scale developments are pursued through
development agreements.22
Legislation authorizing development agreements and
annexation agreements typically allows for wholesale exceptions
to existing land use codes, and the few courts who have
considered the issue agree that projects undertaken through
such agreements are not subject to Takings Clause limitations.23
Indeed, because development agreements and annexation
agreements are characterized as voluntary contracts, they allow
cities unprecedented flexibility to accommodate developers. In
exchange, developers may provide contributions to cities, which
are typically placed into a general fund or earmarked for
unrelated pet projects.24 This framework allows the developer to
18

Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 12, at 16-21.
Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & Michael H. Zischke, Development Agreements:
Securing Vested Rights and Project Completion Benefits, in 1989 ZONING AND PLANNING
LAW HANDBOOK 349, 360 (Mark S. Dennison ed., 1989).
20
NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING
LAW: LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER § 154A.02, at 145 (Supp. 2002).
21
David L. Callies & Julie A. Tappendorf, Unconstitutional Land
Development Conditions and the Development Agreement Solution: Bargaining for
Public Facilities After Nollan and Dolan, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 663, 664 (2001).
22
See DAVID L. CALLIES, PRESERVING PARADISE: WHY REGULATION WON’T
WORK 46, 53 (1994) (noting that hundreds of communities in California have used
development agreements).
23
See, e.g., Leroy Land Dev. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 939 F.2d 696,
698-99 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding nexus requirement does not apply in settlement
agreement between agency and developer “because the promise is entered into
voluntarily, in good faith and is supported by consideration”); Xenia Rural Water Ass’n
v. Dallas Cnty., 445 N.W.2d 785, 788-89 (Iowa 1989) (holding negotiated setback
requirement not a taking where part of agreement between parties); Meredith v. Talbot
Cnty., 560 A.2d 599, 604 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) (stating that agreement between
developer and county in which developer agreed to convey property to conservation
group in exchange for approval was not a taking because the agreement was an
“informed business decision” benefiting the developer and thus voluntary, even if “the
decision was made in the face of likely adverse governmental action”).
24
Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 12, at 30-33.
19
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negotiate with the city for those changes but, as with
negotiated zoning, public input is at best indirect.25 As a result,
adjacent residents and local businesses bear most of the burden
but may receive none of the benefits.26
The bilateral-negotiation model—whether through more
conventional, negotiated zoning or the more recent,
development-agreement variation—is now the baseline process
for land use regulation in virtually every state in the United
States.27 Although negotiated zoning and development
agreements promote more negotiation and flexibility than the
traditional, unilateral command-and-control model, certain
characteristics of this paradigm shift have undermined its
legitimacy. Chief among these criticisms is that the
negotiation, implementation, and monitoring processes are
exclusionary.28 Because both negotiated zoning and
development agreements typically involve only the developer
and the local government, affected community groups are
necessarily left out of the equation.29 Additionally, these
arrangements can lead to inefficient agreements that fail to
reflect the full range of interests affected by the land use
conflict.30 It also places the local government planner in the
unworkable position of negotiating on behalf of many
competing interests with little input from the parties who will
be affected.31 Because of this bilateral orientation, the
negotiation process and subsequent approval process are also
criticized for promoting conflict and ignoring the long-term
community engagement that is essential to the legitimacy of
decentralized decision-making processes.32 Finally, although
this agreement-by-agreement approach is ad hoc by nature, it
simultaneously fails to adapt to change. In particular, it fails to
provide mechanisms that ensure continued monitoring and

25

See id. at 23-30.
Id. at 33, 39-40.
27
See, e.g., Mark Cordes, Policing Bias and Conflicts of Interest in Zoning
Decisionmaking, 65 N.D. L. REV. 161, 166-67 (1989); Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains
and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1, 26-27 (2000); Carol
M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local
Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 849 (1983); Erin Ryan, Zoning, Taking, and Dealing:
The Problems and Promise of Bargaining in Land Use Planning Conflicts, 7 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 337, 347-48 (2002).
28
Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 12, at 39.
29
CALLIES, supra note 22, at 53.
30
Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 12, at 15.
31
Id. at 40.
32
Id. at 65.
26
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adjustment of decisions in order to account for changed
circumstances or new information.33
II.

CBAS AS A RESPONSE TO THE BILATERAL MODEL

CBAs emerged as a tool to help resolve land use conflict
largely in response to the lack of transparency and stakeholder
representation in public land use decisions. In contrast to
development agreements—to which the developer and the
governmental authority are the only parties—CBAs are usually
negotiated directly between the project developer and
community representatives.34 Rather than containing terms
between a developer and the local government, CBAs specify
public benefits that a developer will provide in order to secure
community support for (or at least tolerance of) the proposed
project.35 Typically, local groups relinquish the right to
challenge project approvals and sometimes agree to provide
affirmative support in exchange for the developer’s agreement
to provide community benefits.36
CBAs range in shape and size. Some are small
agreements between one or more local groups, while others are
essentially city-wide contracts that involve many community
stakeholders and provide wide-ranging community benefits.
Examples of the community benefits these agreements secure
include funding for affordable housing, parking, park space,
living wages, and local hiring.37 Most CBAs—such as the
Ballpark Village CBA in San Diego, the Atlantic Yards CBA in
Brooklyn, and the Los Angeles International Airport and
Staples Center CBAs in Los Angeles—are private agreements,
signed between community groups and the developer directly.38
Even privately negotiated CBAs, however, will often include
governmental involvement at some stage.39 In some cases,
private CBAs have been incorporated into the public regulatory
33

Id. at 50.
See Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local Government
Tool or Another Variation on the Exactions Theme?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 5, 5 (2010).
35
See Christine A. Fazio & Judith Wallace, Legal and Policy Issues Related to
Community Benefits Agreements, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 543, 557 (2010).
36
Benjamin S. Beach, Strategies and Lessons from the Los Angeles Community
Benefits Experience, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 77, 105 (2008).
37
Id. at 98.
38
See Been, supra note 34, at 7.
39
Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Understanding Community Benefits
Agreements, 24 PRAC. REAL EST. LAW., no. 4, July 2008, at 20 [hereinafter Salkin &
Lavine, Understanding I].
34
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process through development agreements, while other “public”
CBAs were negotiated directly between the governmental
authority and the developer, enabling government involvement
in the agreement’s implementation and enforcement.40
Examples of this latter type of agreement include the
Cherokee-Gates Rubber CBA in Denver, agreements related to
the Yale Cancer Center in New Haven, and the Oak-to-Ninth
project in Oakland.41 Still other public CBAs involved a
governmental entity as the developer, such as the CBA
negotiated by the Los Angeles World Airport Authority.42
Nonetheless, some assert that any agreements that involve
governmental authorities are not CBAs but rather public–
private partnerships.43
In some sense, CBAs can be understood as an extension
of more conventional forms of private ordering in the land use
context, similar to real covenants and easements in that they
allow the developer and other stakeholders to negotiate land
use restrictions. Indeed, CBAs are most similar to conventional
servitudes in that they involve a set of promises that are
intended to burden the use of—and to run with—particular
land.44 Of course, many CBAs differ from private land use
controls in that they require local government involvement at
some stage.45 Additionally, even purely private CBAs do not
involve a transfer of a real property interest. Indeed, their
affirmative promises typically are not intended to benefit any

40

Id.
Julian Gross, Community Benefits Agreements: Definitions, Values, and
Legal Enforceability, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY. DEV. L. 35, 37, 47
(2008) (describing how community organizations sometimes use the term to describe
any outcome resulting in campaigned-for community benefits, while local government
officials and developers sometimes use CBAs to describe any set of community benefits
commitments to which they agree).
42
Id. at 51.
43
But see David A. Marcello, Community Benefit Agreements: New Vehicle for
Investment in America’s Neighborhoods, 39 URB. LAW. 657, 660-61 (2007) (making a clear
distinction between CBAs, which he defines as having no government involvement, and
development agreements, which he calls “Public-Private Partnerships”).
44
Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.1(1) (2000) (defining
servitude as “a legal device that creates a right or an obligation that runs with land or
an interest in land”); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 224-25 (3d ed. 2010) (“Land
use restrictions intended to run with the land are called ‘covenants’ or ‘servitudes.’”).
45
See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. Cf. Terry Pristin, In Major
Projects, Agreeing not to Disagree, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2006, at C6 (characterizing
New York City’s CBA process that excludes local government officials as atypical of
most CBA processes).
41

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2269157

2013]

CBAs AND BILATERAL LAND USE REGULATION

363

particular real property interest.46 CBAs thus routinely include
as parties community stakeholders who may or may not be
landowners. Perhaps the most distinctive feature of private
CBAs in contrast to servitudes is the fact that the
consideration stakeholders often provide for any community
benefits is a return promise to support or at least acquiesce in
the development.47
A.

The Virtues of the CBA Trend

The increased use of CBAs has provided several benefits
to the now-prevalent bilateral-negotiation model of land use
regulation. Some commenters have argued that the negotiated
outcomes are more effective, efficient, fair, and legitimate as a
result of CBAs.48 CBAs enable community stakeholders to
negotiate the mitigation of development impacts that adversely
affect surrounding neighborhoods. These effects on the
surrounding community can include severe environmental
concerns, economic concerns, or strain on local facilities or
resources.49 In the case of the UNIDAD CBA in South Los
Angeles, where the property owner had demolished one of the
few medical facilities in the community to make way for
upscale apartments, the community coalition was able to
negotiate for a medical clinic as well as money for a land trust
to support low-income housing in a new development.50 CBAs
can thus ensure that developers and local governments do not
overlook these community impacts when planning or approving
development projects.51
46

See GROSS ET AL., supra note 9, at 10 (outlining common community
benefits negotiated for, including living wage requirements, local hiring, space for
community centers or clinics, parks or green spaces, and affordable housing).
47
Beach, supra note 36, at 97.
48
See, e.g., GROSS ET AL., supra note 9, at 21-22 (“The CBA negotiation
process provides a mechanism to ensure that community concerns are heard and
addressed . . . . CBAs commit developers in writing to promises they make regarding
their projects, and make enforcement much easier . . . . CBAs encourage early
negotiation between developers and the community, avoiding delays in the approval
process.”). Cf. Daniel P. Selmi, The Contract Transformation in Land Use Regulation,
63 STAN. L. REV. 591, 624-25 (2011) (asserting negotiated development can serve to
promote economic efficiency).
49
Fazio & Wallace, supra note 35, at 545.
50
Pei Wu, supra note 3, at 38-41 (describing the CBA process and outcome
between UNIDAD and developer).
51
Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Understanding Community Benefits
Agreements: Equitable Development, Social Justice and Other Considerations for
Developers, Municipalities and Community Organizations, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 291, 295-96 (2008) [hereinafter Salkin & Lavine, Understanding II] (“CBAs are
considered by their supporters to be powerful tools for assuring that community
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To the extent that these agreements integrate the full
range of interests of affected parties, CBAs have the potential
to promote and perhaps best approximate the broader public
interest.52 Such an assertion mirrors claims raised on behalf of
other multilateral or collaborative regulatory processes.53
Various commenters have reported community participants’
substantial satisfaction with the outcome of CBAs,54 including
the development of long-term collaboration among community
members as a result of CBAs.55 In addition to mitigating the
negative effects from development, community groups can also
secure extra amenities that otherwise would be unobtainable,
either because they are not traditionally addressed in the
normal planning process56 or because of local government
budget constraints.57 Of course, the very existence of the CBA
itself is evidence that every party believed it was better off with
an agreement than without one.
In addition to improving substantive outcomes, there is
a credible argument that CBAs may improve land use decision-

impacts will not be overlooked when large developments are planned for the
neighborhood”); see also Been, supra note 34, at 15 (“CBAs may give neighborhoods a
more meaningful role in the development process than the opportunities the existing
land use process provides for public participation.”).
52
See GROSS ET AL., supra note 9, at 16 (discussing the wide array of
community interests included in the LAX CBA in Los Angeles, such as labor unions,
environmentalists, church congregations, educators, administrators, and minority
interest groups).
53
See Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study
in Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 309-10 (2007) (describing how
advocates of collaborative habitat conservation planning argued that collaborative
regulation would serve to better approximate the public interest by integrating
stakeholders early and throughout agreement formation and implementation).
54
See, e.g., Pei Wu, supra note 3, at 41 (“[M]ost are extremely excited at the
prospect of a new community health center, small business spaces, new jobs at living
wages, and other benefits to be implemented at the new development. The hope is that
this can become an anchor for community well-being, instead of something that
contributes to community displacement.”).
55
See, e.g., GROSS ET AL., supra note 9, at 32 (“[O]rganizers note that
organizations that learned to work together through the Staples negotiations have
continued collaborating with regard to other projects. In this respect, success has bred
success; the coalition-building aspect of the CBA process has indeed led to lasting
collaboration, resulting in greater political effectiveness for participants.”).
56
See, e.g., GROSS ET AL., supra note 9, at 14 (discussing the “unprecedented”
features of the Staples CBA in Los Angeles, including “a developer-funded assessment
of community park [and] recreation needs, . . . a goal that 70% of the jobs created in the
project will pay the City’s living wage, . . . consultation with the coalition on selection of
tenants[,] . . . increased affordable housing requirements in the housing component of
the project, and a commitment of seed money for other affordable housing
projects . . . .”); Been, supra note 34, at 17 (noting negotiations for wage rates or
employment practices).
57
Fazio & Wallace, supra note 35, at 544.
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making processes. Some evidence shows that community
members believe CBAs can lead to a more effective, fair, and
legitimate decision-making process.58 In contrast with the more
common adversarial approach that usually generates litigation,
many prefer the CBA process because it provides an opportunity
for more creative and cooperative problem solving.59 Moreover,
because CBAs can increase community participation in land use
decisions, they arguably have intrinsic democratic value beyond
mere participant satisfaction.60 CBAs grant communities,
including low-income and minority groups, a voice in the
development process, empowering them with a degree of control
where corporate interests usually dominate.61 As such, CBAs
offer community groups the opportunity for procedural justice by
enabling them to participate directly in decision making. Such
direct stakeholder participation has been shown to increase the
perceived legitimacy of public decision-making processes like
CBAs,62 independent of the ultimate substantive outcome.63
Satisfaction with the CBA process is not limited to the
community groups who negotiate them. Developers also benefit
from its procedural advantages by obtaining less expensive
conflict resolution, generating community goodwill and support
(which can help secure regulatory approval), and fostering
long-term development viability through investment in the
surrounding community.64 While vocal community opposition
58

See, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 1; Thomas A. Musil, The Sleeping Giant:
Community Benefit Agreements and Urban Development, 44 URB. LAW. 827, 842 (2013)
(stating surveyed community stakeholders believed CBAs improved the development
process); Mitch Thompson, Harrison Residents Grasp CBA as a Tool Towards Racial and
Economic Equity, in COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS: GROWING A MOVEMENT IN
MINNESOTA
6-8
(2008),
available
at
http://www.metrostability.org/
efiles/CBAREPORT.pdf.
59
See Fazio & Wallace, supra note 35, at 544-45.
60
See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State,
45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 27 (1997) [hereinafter Freeman I].
61
Salkin & Lavine, Understanding II, supra note 51, at 299; see also GROSS
ET AL., supra note 9, at 35.
62
Nathan Markey, Atlantic Yards Community Benefit Agreement: A Case Study of
Organizing Community Support for Development, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 377, 380 (2009).
63
See Kirk Emerson et al., The Challenges of Environmental Conflict
Resolution, in THE PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 3, 8 (Rosemary O’Leary & Lisa B. Bingham eds., 2003); Jody Freeman,
Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1311
n.104 (2003) (citing empirical evidence that the public values due process and that fair
and inclusive procedures may increase future compliance and perceptions of
legitimacy); see also generally TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
64
See, e.g., Been, supra note 34, at 18 (“Some developers . . . have accepted
and even embraced the use of CBAs because they may secure some measure of
community support for, or at least reduce opposition to, the development. Even if the
developer believes the project will be approved without a CBA, by gaining support (or
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can stall projects for years in litigation and severely delay
development, CBAs allow developers to address the
community’s concerns up front.65 CBAs can thus “provide
certainty to a developer that its project can be constructed on”
schedule without the risk of litigation delay.66 In addition,
public support can help “facilitate[] [a] project’s passage
through the city’s municipal and regulatory channels,”67
enabling developers to more easily obtain government approval
or subsidies68 for their projects.69 Particularly when projects will
require city infrastructure investments or public financing,
community support can be invaluable to developers. Finally, it
is worth noting that negotiated benefits that go to area
residents may ultimately have lasting positive benefits for the
eventual development project as well. Some assert that the
developer’s agreement to give priority to local workers during
construction of the airport in the Los Angeles World Airport
CBA, for example, may have positively affected the project’s
ultimate profitability.70 Similarly, such negotiations likely
provide developers valuable insights about local market
interest in their development and potential alterations that
might improve such marketability.
Municipalities may play a neutral role in private CBAs,
like in the Lorenzo Project agreement, but they also stand to
benefit from the decreased political and legal pressure that
emerges from negotiated agreements between developers and
community groups.71 Successful negotiations could mean that a

reducing opposition) for the project in the community, a CBA may reduce the risk of
rejection or save the developer time in the approval process.”); Salkin & Lavine,
Understanding II, supra note 51, at 293-94 (explaining value of community support to
developers). But see Selmi, supra note 48, at 642 (asserting that CBA use has not been
widespread, “in part because developers have little incentive to enter into them”).
65
Been, supra note 34, at 19 (“A CBA will reduce the chances of a lawsuit being
filed; the more inclusive the CBA is, the more certainty a developer will have that a
project will proceed on a timely basis.”); Steven P. Frank, Note, Yes In My Backyard:
Developers, Government, and Communities Working Together Through Development
Agreements and Community Benefit Agreements, 42 IND. L. REV. 227, 247 (2009).
66
Fazio & Wallace, supra note 35, at 544.
67
Naved Sheikh, Note, Community Benefits Agreements: Can Private Contracts
Replace Public Responsibility?, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 223, 242 (2008).
68
Been, supra note 34, at 7 (“Community opposition also may affect whether
government agencies are willing to help fund the project.”).
69
Marcello, supra note 43, at 658.
70
As one commentator observed, “[t]hese additional dollars ‘roll over’ several
times in the local economy, generating multiple waves of economic development. Many
dollars go to existing small businesses whose customer base may be eroded by new
large-scale developments.” Id. at 668.
71
Been, supra note 34, at 20.
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local government will spend fewer of its resources defending
environmental or land use decisions.72 In addition, a broad
number of disparate concerns may be addressed through CBAs
without a government spending its political capital to address
them.73 Perhaps most importantly, CBAs also enable
municipalities to be creative in devising solutions to conflicts
and provide more flexibility than conventional negotiatedzoning processes.74
Finally, an important but underappreciated procedural
benefit of CBAs is that they accomplish the important goal of
memorializing the relationships among community members.
CBAs embody the recognition and explicit establishment of a
long-term relationship between stakeholders. In this sense,
CBAs can foster community building, and when combined with
a development agreement, they can be a vehicle to promote
both flexibility and certainty in the regulatory process.75 Like
development agreements, CBAs can be useful tools for
adaptively managing uncertainty through contingency
planning: they can anticipate where there are uncertainties
and incorporate processes into the agreement that account for
known contingencies and the possibility of new information or
changed circumstances.76 Yet development agreements can also
provide certainty to a developer by delivering clear assurances
in the form of vested rights, allowing the developer to proceed
without fear that the city will change midstream the rules
applicable to the property.77
B.

Claimed Shortcomings of CBAs

Though many have extolled the virtues of CBAs, other
commenters have raised numerous concerns about their
increased use. Some critiques have focused on procedural
72

Salkin & Lavine, Understanding II, supra note 51, at 296.
Been, supra note 34, at 20 (“CBAs may allow elected and appointed
officials to distance themselves from politically unpopular community demands or from
politically unpopular developments.”).
74
Id. at 19 (stating “CBAs may allow municipalities to bypass legal
constraints on land use regulation imposed by statute and judicial precedent”).
75
Gross, supra note 41, at 47.
76
Cf. Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A
Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive
Planning in Land Use Decisions (Installment II), 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 269, 296-300
(2005) [hereinafter Camacho, Mustering II] (discussing the potential of development
agreements and other land use agreements for managing uncertainty and promoting
adaptive land use planning).
77
Id. at 299.
73

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2269157

368

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:2

concerns, including a lack of transparency and increased costs,
concerns regarding the transfer of public authority to private
parties, and a range of concerns focused on the adequate
representation of stakeholders. In addition, some commenters
have focused on uncertainties pertaining to the legal
constraints on CBAs. As detailed below,78 however, these
critiques are based on antiquated notions of the private role in
public governance and are more appropriately aimed at the
prevailing bilateral model of public land use controls that CBAs
arose to try, in part, to address.
One critique of the CBA process is that it mingles or
even conflates public and private interests. The CBA
negotiation process’s integration of private interests into the
public decision-making process may be seen as muddying and
79
privatizing public land use regulation. For example, some
critics argue that, because public authorities have an obligation
to provide public services and benefits such as funding for
parks and affordable housing, municipalities and community
groups should not rely on private negotiation with developers
80
to assist in providing them. In this vision of a strict public–
private dichotomy, determinations of the public interest
become tainted when CBAs are incorporated into the zoningapproval process because CBAs involve private parties
81
advancing their private interests. For at least some of these
commenters, a more streamlined and insulated public decisionmaking process, primarily directed and informed by

78

See infra Part IV.
See Musil, supra note 58, at 850-51 (stating how CBAs fit into the public
regulatory process is unknown and that CBAs raise conceptual confusion and
controversy). Cf. Selmi, supra note 48, at 633 (discussing the inherent public interest in
a planning process that “reflects the public interest rather than arbitrarily favoring
private or political interests”); id. at 615 (bargaining between a government and a
developer takes away some of the inherent fairness, neutrality, and legitimacy that
accompanies a purely public regulatory model because bargaining indicates that
parties are biased toward their own positions, but also signals that the government is
willing to give up certain public benefits in the process).
80
See, e.g., Fazio & Wallace, supra note 35, at 551 (“Initially, one could
question whether it is fair that communities need to bargain with private actors for
community resources that governments arguably have an obligation to provide, such as
affordable housing, parks, and adequate funding for schools.”); Sheikh, supra note 67,
at 243 (critiquing the use of CBAs as a tool for governments to negotiate concessions
from developers to finance a city’s unmet infrastructural needs).
81
See, e.g., Gross, supra note 41, at 38 (commenting that private CBAs,
without government guidance or involvement, are prone to community groups without
any interest in the project using CBAs to extort benefits); Musil, supra note 58, at 840
(noting concerns with some private CBAs as having a distorting effect on the public
regulatory process).
79
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knowledgeable bureaucrats, would presumably produce better,
timelier, and more legitimate results.82
Similarly, some critics worry that the continued reliance
on CBAs will produce an increasingly opaque decision-making
process. Indeed, it is true that, as with other negotiated
agreements, CBA negotiations are not required to be
transparent or public.83 Furthermore, although negotiations in
the conventional, public land use decision-making process may
also be inaccessible,84 the opacity in CBA negotiations is even
more pronounced, given that the public process at least
requires a minimal public hearing.85 This lack of transparency
has prompted concerns regarding the potential for unfair
dealing through the CBA negotiation process86 and the parallel
public decision-making process.87 For example, some have
argued that the developer for the Atlantic Yards CBA in
Brooklyn manipulated the CBA process to generate an
appearance of public support to improve the project’s chances of
approval, “yielding just enough concessions to targeted
segments of a community to manufacture a semblance of public
support and earn the needed permits and approvals from
government entities.”88
Other commentators focus on the increased burdens
CBAs place on developers, using the prevailing public bilateral
process with limited public participation as a baseline of
comparison. For example, some commentators raise concerns
regarding the potential that governments will place pressure on
developers to engage in CBAs.89 Others have identified the

82

Sean F. Nolon, Negotiating the Wind: A Framework to Engage Citizens in
Siting Wind Turbines, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 327, 330-31 (2011).
83
Cf. Fazio & Wallace, supra note 35, at 552 (discussing how transparency is
essential but not required for CBAs).
84
Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 12, at 36-42 (detailing the regularly
perfunctory and imbalanced public participation in bilateral public land use regulation).
85
Selmi, supra note 48, at 643.
86
See, e.g., Fazio & Wallace, supra note 35, at 552 (stating CBAs might be
unfair to taxpayers because public funds in the form of favorable tax breaks might be
directed to only one area of the community through a benefits package).
87
Sheikh, supra note 67, at 231, 242; cf. LAWRENCE S. BACOW & MICHAEL
WHEELER, ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 362 (1984) (arguing that by
“encouraging people to resolve disputes through negotiation, as opposed to
litigation, . . . [communities] will strike deals that are good for themselves and bad for
society as a whole”).
88
Sheikh, supra note 67, at 242.
89
See Gross, supra note 41, at 44 (stating a developer might argue that CBA
commitments were made under pressure by elected officials and are invalid because
they result from governmental action outside of the established approval process).
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additional transaction costs a separate CBA process creates for
developers.90
Some of the most frequent criticisms of the CBA
process, however, focus on community groups’ inability to
adequately promote stakeholder interests during the CBA’s
negotiation and implementation. These critiques include
questions about whether the full range of interests are
represented in negotiations;91 whether a representative of a
particular interest group is truly representative, including
whether they have properly managed diverse points of view;92
and whether stakeholders have the capability to negotiate and
monitor agreement implementation effectively.93 These
concerns are amplified further by the fact that federal, state, or
even municipal laws fail to mandate a particular negotiation
framework or protocol, leaving each CBA negotiation subject to
a separate organic process and rendering community groups
unable to leverage lessons from prior negotiations.
A number of commenters have argued that the absence
of procedural mechanisms for ensuring effective and fair
coalition composition has caused community interests to be
represented too narrowly or in a biased manner. As an initial
matter, some observers state that CBAs must be sufficiently
inclusive of community interests to make the settlement
meaningful.94 Indeed, because public support is a crucial
bargaining chip, the range of stakeholders represented must be
broad enough for the community coalition to be credible.95
90

See e.g., Been, supra note 34, at 30 (discussing the additional processes and
transactional costs that CBAs require of developers, including establishing systems for
transparency into developer activities not previously public).
91
Fazio & Wallace, supra note 35, at 552.
92
Id. at 551-52 (“Another question is whether the groups that negotiated the
CBA . . . should determine which groups should benefit.”); Been, supra note 34, at 24
(discussing problems with managing the various community group interests in
negotiating the terms of the Atlantic Yards CBA).
93
See, e.g., GROSS ET AL., supra note 9, at 23, 25 (recognizing potential legal
costs and lack of experience with CBAs as impediments to community group
participation in CBA negotiations); Beach, supra note 36, at 103 (discussing CBA
enforcement and how “some groups may not have the capacity or desire to monitor
compliance”); Fazio & Wallace, supra note 35, at 553 (“Another concern is whether the
community parties have sufficient expertise to negotiate with developers for the
CBA.”); Salkin & Levine, Understanding II, supra note 51, at 323 (footnote omitted)
(“The costs of negotiating a CBA can be high. Organizing a coalition, holding meetings,
conducting community research and preparing reports will all require funding.
Coalitions that have no experience with CBAs, moreover, will likely need technical and
legal assistance throughout the negotiation process. The funding required for all of this
may inhibit the process.”).
94
Frank, supra note 65, at 252-53.
95
Id. (footnote omitted).
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However, experienced developers may strategically undermine
coalitions by identifying potential stakeholders not represented
by the coalition.96 As a result, “CBAs with limited participation
have met with equally limited success.”97 More importantly,
when a coalition is too small, it risks excluding valuable voices
from the community98 or allowing certain interests
disproportionate power. For example, “In the Atlantic Yards
project, one community group” that obtained benefits in
exchange for the group’s public support “openly dismissed the
complaints of other groups opposing the development.”99
Additionally, in San Diego, a number of “local residents decried
the heavy influence that labor unions played in the Ballpark
Village CBA.”100
On the other hand, an overly broad coalition
precipitates different concerns. A very diverse coalition can be
difficult to create, coordinate, and manage.101 Broad campaigns
thus are more likely to result in a divergence of interests,
making cooperation and unity difficult to achieve. In these
situations, developers can more easily exploit factions by
attempting to pare down community representation in the
coalition to preserve the appearance of community involvement
while excluding many key groups and issues from
negotiations.102 These CBAs not only lose credibility but also
raise significant concerns about the capacity of private CBAs
alone to promote land use decisions that advance broader
public interests.
Various scholars have also detailed limitations in
community stakeholders’ capacities to effectively negotiate
CBAs, keep stakeholder representatives accountable, and
monitor developer performance. First, the costs of negotiating a
CBA may dissuade or impede stakeholder representatives.103 In
addition, stakeholder representatives may be hindered by
inexperience and lack resources to investigate project effects or
determine the best terms for stakeholders, particularly as
96

Beach, supra note 36, at 100.
Frank, supra note 65, at 253.
Been, supra note 34, at 22.
99
Sheikh, supra note 67, at 236 (footnote omitted).
100
Id. (footnote omitted).
101
Frank, supra note 65, at 252-53.
102
See Been, supra note 34, at 24-25; Salkin & Lavine, Understanding I,
supra note 39, at 30-31.
103
Musil, supra note 58, at 848 (stating CBA participants reported a range of
concerns regarding cost and resource challenges of CBA negotiation); Salkin & Lavine,
Understanding II, supra note 51, at 323.
97
98
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compared to the greater sophistication of real estate developers
in negotiating land use agreements.104 This limited capacity to
assess what constitutes an appropriate agreement is
exacerbated by the confidentiality of negotiations and terms of
previously executed CBAs.105 Moreover, because CBAs may not
be connected to the public regulatory process, stakeholders
have no guaranteed forum where they can express their views
about the CBA terms or procedure, and no formal way to hold
negotiators accountable.106 Finally, monitoring the developer to
ensure adequate performance presents practical, financial, and
administrative challenges for stakeholders.107
Some commenters have also pointed to uncertainties
surrounding the legal enforceability of CBAs, given that courts
have not yet examined their validity as private contracts and
the absence of express statutory or regulatory authority for
CBAs.108 Accordingly, some scholars question whether
community groups provide sufficient consideration for the
agreement to be enforceable, although most ultimately
conclude that they do.109 Moreover, there are uncertainties
regarding the extent to which community stakeholders have
standing to sue to enforce the contract terms, particularly
when they are not express parties to the agreement.110 Finally,
some scholars question the extent to which CBAs, when
integrated into the public land use process, would be subject to
regulatory exactions limitations.111 Under the Fifth Amendment
and analogous state constitutional takings limitations, any
governmental conditions on project approvals must have a
nexus to the project’s impacts and be roughly proportional to
those impacts.112 This concern may come into sharpest relief
104

Been, supra note 34, at 24-25.
Id. at 25.
106
Id. at 21-22, 24.
107
Id. at 30.
108
Musil, supra note 58, at 838-39; Sheikh, supra note 67, at 233.
109
See, e.g., Salkin & Lavine, Understanding I, supra note 39, at 31. Salkin
and Levine suggest promises to support or not to oppose development applications
before public land use authorities may not be sufficient when compared to the
extensive benefits and concessions offered by developers, particularly when the
negotiating community group is not well-organized or broad and the developer’s need
for community support is low. See id. However, the authors conclude that under
general contract theory, “which does not generally inquire into the adequacy of
consideration,” such promises can have substantial value for a developer are likely to
be deemed supported by consideration. See id.
110
See id. at 32.
111
Id.
112
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386, 391 (1994) (holding that a local
government must show that there is a rough proportionality between the exactions and
105
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where a developer is required to sign a CBA as part of a public
regulatory approval, government officials are closely involved
in negotiations, or a CBA is reached proximate to a public
approval.113
III.

THE PERSISTENT LIMITATIONS OF PUBLIC BILATERAL
NEGOTIATION

Although there is some merit to commentators’ concerns
over the increasing reliance on CBAs, these critiques are
largely misplaced. CBAs have emerged as a fundamental
consequence of the lack of stakeholder representation inherent
in the now-prevalent bilateral-negotiation model. Yet CBAs
largely function parallel to the public land use process rather
than as a part of it. As currently utilized in land use decision
making, these agreements can partially and occasionally
address inadequacies of the bilateral model, but they certainly
cannot abate them all. Rather, the critiques levied against
CBAs are more appropriately understood as criticisms of the
underlying bilateral model’s limitations. Furthermore, because
CBAs have been treated as separate from the public land use
process instead of as concerted attempts to renovate it, many of
the problems with the bilateral model have been exacerbated
by an increased reliance on CBAs.
As explained above, the prevailing bilateral land use
decision-making process provides extensive and unparalleled
opportunities for negotiation by the developer while furnishing
very limited participation for other affected parties. As a result,
public land use controls are often criticized as being susceptible
to corruption or disproportionate developer influence,
unnecessarily adversarial, and ad hoc but unable to adapt to
changed circumstances.114 Stakeholders turned to CBAs as a
response to the limitations of conventional bilateral bargaining,

the projected impact of the proposed development); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483
U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (holding that to avoid an unconstitutional taking of private
property, a “nexus” must exist between any imposed land use exaction and the effects
of a proposed development).
113
Been, supra note 34, at 27-28.
114
See generally Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 12, at 42-62 (detailing the
range of concerns about bilateral land use regulation); see also generally Selmi, supra
note 48, at 611-42 (detailing concerns regarding the effects of the contract model of
land use regulation on various governmental norms).
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as a way to better reflect the multiplicity of affected interests.115
In this sense, they have proved useful in increasing
stakeholders’ involvement in land use disputes. Many
commenters—as well as some developers and municipalities—
have recognized the value of stakeholder involvement in
increasing information, mitigating the likely negative effects
from proposed development on other stakeholders, reducing
long-term conflict, and helping promote an interactive civic
life.116
Despite these benefits, concerns persist about CBAs’
efficacy and legitimacy. Many critics of CBAs, however, seem to
overlook the existing design of the broader regulatory
framework and thus neglect the underlying problems of the
prevailing bilateral model. The problems raised by these
critiques stem more fundamentally from the bilateral model—
and the favored position of developers in the process—than
from any inherent limitation of CBAs. For example, although
private CBAs may enable land use decisions to reflect the
broader range of affected interests, they fail to resolve the lack
of transparency in the decision-making process as they are
currently used. Indeed, CBAs still allow key moments in the
process to remain private, keeping them opaque and hidden
from public view. In that sense, the emergence of private CBAs
has further reduced transparency, removing important
decisions from public examination. Nevertheless, this opacity
more fundamentally originated from the prevailing bilateral
land use process’s limited opportunities for participation and
its vulnerability to unfair dealing, not from CBAs themselves.
Perhaps the most problematic features of CBAs,
however, stem from their use of parallel private negotiations to
supplement or circumvent the public land use process in lieu of
any concerted attempt to improve public governance. Although
the integration of private and public processes is not
problematic per se,117 CBAs undoubtedly have an uneasy and
unclear relationship with public land use decision making as
they are currently used. And this vagueness is troublesome.
CBAs are not wholly private, as they obligate stakeholders to
support or acquiesce in development applications that are
115

Cf. Been, supra note 34, at 15 (discussing how supporters of CBAs argue
that standard public “land use procedures often fail to ensure that the concerns of the
neighborhood most affected by the proposed development are considered and
adequately addressed”).
116
See supra notes 48-77 and accompanying text.
117
See supra notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
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before public decision makers. Yet they are not public
agreements either, as they are typically negotiated without the
involvement of public authorities and entered into only by
private parties. Treating CBAs as both supplemental and
distinct from the public land use process creates a new category
of agreement that introduces various legal uncertainties,
including their questionable validity, enforceability, and
relationship to regulatory exactions.118 Of course, introducing a
parallel private process alongside the existing public one also
leads to foreseeable inefficiencies and increased costs for both
developers and other community members.119
Furthermore, by failing to incorporate CBAs’
stakeholder participation mechanisms into the public process,
the use of CBAs remains largely elective. CBAs may provide
community stakeholders with opportunities for additional
input on local community land use decisions, but only when the
developer so chooses. In virtually every jurisdiction in the
United States, the developer decides the fundamental
questions in the CBA process. These questions include whether
the CBA process will be used at all; which stakeholders may
negotiate; the framework and extent of the negotiation,
including the timing, amount, and types of participation by
interested stakeholders; and the relationship between the CBA
negotiation process and the public regulatory process.120 As with
the more conventional bilateral process, this framework is
likely to systematically overvalue developers’ interest in
relation to other stakeholders.121 Accordingly, although CBAs
may provide other stakeholders with additional opportunities
to exert influence, they arguably make the developer an even
greater focus of that process.
A corollary to all of this, of course, is that local
government planners become less important to the mediation
of multilateral land use conflicts. While the standard bilateral
public-negotiation process places government planning officials
in the difficult position of negotiating for many competing and
subjective interests with only limited participatory input,122 the
private CBA process detaches the local government planner—
with all her skills for information generation and capacity
118
119
120
121
122

See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
See GROSS ET AL., supra note 9, at 23.
See supra notes 90-105 and accompanying text.
Camacho, Mustering II, supra note 76, at 283.
Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 12, at 50.
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building—from such decision making. Indeed, the critique of
CBAs as presenting a suite of stakeholder representation
problems is persuasive precisely because the local
governmental authority has been divested of any responsibility
or involvement in community organization, information
gathering and dissemination, and capacity building.123
In sum, CBAs may provide a range of participatory
benefits. Because they are ad hoc and elective patches to the
public regulatory process, however, they alone cannot fix a
regulatory system that often leads to inefficient, unfair, and
undemocratic decisions. In fact, their reliance on the developer
as the key actor may further erode the public decision-making
process. Moreover, CBAs’ current lack of transparency and
uncertain relationship with public regulation may further
divide rather than bridge the considerable accountability and
legitimacy gap that exists in public land use governance.
IV.

INTEGRATING STAKEHOLDERS THROUGH COLLABORATIVE
GOVERNANCE

One of the primary criticisms of CBAs is that they blur
the lines between public and private land use processes.124
However, integrating and relying on private parties in public
processes is not illegitimate simply because it might complicate
understandings of the relationship between private parties and
public governance. Any such critique would rely on an
antiquated understanding of governance that expects a strict
divide between public and private spheres and envisions a very
limited private role in public processes.125
Indeed, such a critique vitally disregards how the
prevailing bilateral process already blurs the line between
public and private roles in land use decision making—at least
for developers. The departure from a unilateral model of public
land use regulation was largely due to recognition that public
planners were unable to divine the public interest through
objective expertise.126 Yet in its place, regulatory processes have
increasingly been designed to grant certain private parties—
123

Camacho, Mustering II, supra note 76, at 287.
See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
125
Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
543, 558 (2000) [hereinafter Freeman II] (describing the New Deal Era theory of
administrative law which viewed the role of the government separate and insulated
from private interest).
126
Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 12, at 5.
124
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namely developers—considerable advantages over others in the
bargaining process.127 Although the bilateral model correctly
rejects the formalist distinctions between public and private
embodied in the unilateral model of zoning, it has legitimacy
problems of its own. In particular, the bilateral model grants
developers considerable access to revise the rules applicable to
their property, while permitting limited public input. By doing
so, the bilateral model marginalizes other stakeholders, leading
to poorly informed and unfair decisions that often fail to
adequately reflect the interests of all affected parties.128
As many scholars have argued, private parties are not
antithetical to public processes. In fact, active private
participation is critical to successful governance.129 Professor
130
131
Jody Freeman and other leading scholars have persuasively
challenged the formal public–private distinction in regulation,
proposing an alternative conception of governance as a set of
negotiated relationships between public and private actors.132
What is vital is that regulatory processes are designed to
effectively and fairly harness private resources to promote
public ends.133 Unfortunately, the existing bilateral model—
notwithstanding the elective and sporadic complement of
CBAs—fails to consistently integrate the full range of affected
stakeholders into the governance process in an effective or
equitable manner.
Because of the questionable legitimacy of CBAs, some
commenters have recommended that local governments refrain
from using them.134 Alternatively, some have argued that if
CBAs are used, they should be shielded from the public land
use process through the prohibition of government involvement
127

Id. at 30-33.
See generally Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 12.
129
See generally Freeman II, supra note 125 (describing activities
traditionally associated with government that depend heavily on private participation).
130
See generally Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New
Administrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813 (2000) [hereinafter Freeman III]; Jody
Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155 (2001) [hereinafter
Freeman IV].
131
See, e.g., Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Globalizing State: A Future-Oriented
Perspective on the Public/Private Distinction, Federalism, and Democracy, 31 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 769, 802 (1998) (discussing role of globalization in creating new forms of
blended public and private power); Mark Aronson, A Public Lawyer’s Response to
Privatisation and Outsourcing, in THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 52 (Michael
Taggart ed., 1997) (discussing roles of public and private actors in what he calls
“mixed” administrations).
132
See generally Freeman III, supra note 130.
133
Id. at 824.
134
Been, supra note 34, at 31.
128
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in their negotiation, implementation, or enforcement.135 Rather
than isolating stakeholders and public authorities from each
other, or using CBAs as a selective, ad hoc supplement to the
existing bilateral framework, states should integrate lessons
from the more collaborative CBAs into the governance process.
As I have argued more extensively elsewhere, states should
require municipalities to integrate mechanisms for stakeholder
participation and negotiation more fully into the process.136
Additional opportunities to participate in governance should be
included at all phases of the regulatory process, from initial
city-wide planning through development construction and
operation.137 This could mean giving affected stakeholders direct
responsibility for implementing or monitoring elements of the
regulatory regime that implicate their interests.138 Instead of
prohibiting or limiting the terms of CBAs, the law should
induce local governments to look for opportunities to harness
private parties to promote public ends.139
By adjusting the public regulatory process to require the
integration of more effective participation opportunities for
stakeholders, states can stimulate democratic participation,
minimize the costs associated with relying on separate public and
private negotiations, and promote decisions that better reflect
the interests of all affected parties.140 Integrating private parties
would also alleviate the concerns about opacity and enforceability
that currently plague the bilateral public process and CBAs.
Additionally, this multilateral model would have the ancillary
effect of limiting the need for private agreements altogether.141
A realistic and appropriate avenue for the expansion of
meaningful participation opportunities lies in existing
statewide enabling acts that authorize local governments to
enter into development agreements and/or annexation
agreements.142 Because they are increasingly used for large135

Id.
Camacho, Mustering II, supra note 76, at 280-81.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Freeman I, supra note 60, at 27.
140
Cf. Camacho, Mustering II, supra note 76, at 307-14 (discussing the
empirical evidence on decreased costs and increased stakeholder satisfaction from
multilateral land use and environmental dispute resolution processes).
141
Cf. Sheikh, supra note 67, at 245 (“[L]ocal governments should make
private contracts less enticing by adopting processes that include and take into account
community perspectives on land use and development before and during negotiations
with a prospective developer.”).
142
Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 12, at 53-54.
136
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scale development and allow developers and local governments
unparalleled flexibility to shape the substantive terms and
conditions of development, development agreements and
annexation agreements provide the ideal experimental
opportunity to reshape the process to be more participatory and
collaborative. Indeed, because these agreements are voluntary
contracts that provide a developer valuable vested development
rights, most authorities agree that they are not subject to
constitutional exaction limits.143 However, since development
agreements provide few substantive standards to restrict the
scope of negotiations, they prompt concerns of unfair dealing and
increase the need for heightened participation requirements.144
These enabling statutes could be amended to require
development agreements and annexation agreements to be
negotiated openly and publicly, giving affected stakeholders a
voice in negotiations that would compare to the voice they
enjoy in both private and public CBAs. Another possibility is
for the incorporation of community benefits provisions into the
development agreement, which is already done for some CBAs.
Indeed, some commenters promote this practice as a way to
improve enforceability.145 Environmental impact assessment
processes, such as those required under the National
Environmental Policy Act146 and state analogs such as the
California Environmental Quality Act147 or New York State
Environmental Quality Review Act,148 could also be leveraged to
adjust the regulatory process and promote more valuable
stakeholder involvement in considering the scope of project
features, analyzing potential effects, and assessing alternatives.
143

See, e.g., Hermosa Beach Stop Oil Coal. v. City of Hermosa Beach, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 447, 464 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (“[I]t is likely that the City would have
demanded additional consideration from [the developer] for . . . a separate development
agreement.”); Save the Sunset Strip Coal. v. City of W. Hollywood, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d
172, 175 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming trial court conclusion that development
agreement cash payment of $5.2 million does not constitute an illegal sale of city’s
police power and that city need not “identify some particular cost attributable to the
development to justify such a fee”); City of Colo. Springs v. Kitty Hawk Dev. Co., 392
P.2d 467, 472 (Colo. 1964) (holding that a city may impose conditions in annexation
agreement because the city action is “purely contractual”); see also generally Camacho,
Mustering I, supra note 12, at 30-32; Development Agreements, 2 ZONING AND LAND
USE CONTROLS (MB) ch. 9A, at 9A-.04 to -.05 (2012).
144
See Camacho, Mustering II, supra note 76, at 282.
145
Salkin & Lavine, Understanding II, supra note 51, at 325; Frank, supra
note 65, at 251.
146
See National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2005).
147
See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002.1 (West 2012) (California Environmental
Quality Act provision requiring environmental impact reports).
148
See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. §§ 8-0101 to -0117 (McKinney 2005).
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Congruent with modern planning and regulatory theory, these
agreements should be adaptive. For example, they should
include concrete triggers that mandate sustained monitoring
and assessment of compliance, with procedures that permit
periodic adjustments to uncertain conditions in order to account
for new information and changed conditions.149
Once adopted, development agreements would remain
enforceable only by the developer and local government;
however, affected stakeholders could be assigned key monitoring
roles during the implementation and enforcement stages with
respect to the benefits or development impacts that will affect
them most directly.150 This approach would empower motivated
private parties to promote developer accountability and
therefore advance public enforcement goals.151 Equally
significant, incorporating a more multilateral model during each
phase of the development’s evolution through the development
agreement provides a vehicle for fostering and managing an
ongoing relationship between the members of a community.152
In addition, providing more meaningful opportunities
for stakeholder participation reorients the local government
planner to a more effective mediation role. No longer would the
government planner be expected to serve as a negotiator on
behalf of the public interest as she is under the conventional
bilateral model, where the planner is disconnected from
community stakeholders and presumed omniscient about their
needs.153 Nor would the planner be excluded from negotiations,
as is typically the case under the private CBA process. Instead,
the local government representative would help identify
interested stakeholders and inform interested parties about the
potential benefits and effects of proposed development, without
negotiating on their behalf.154
This role as a facilitator, community organizer, and
gatherer and distributor of information draws on a key aspect
of contemporary planning theory and reflects a professional
orientation that planners are increasingly being trained to
embrace.155 Initially, the local government’s function would be
149

Camacho, Mustering II, supra note 76, at 295.
See id. at 301-03.
151
Cf. Freeman I, supra note 60, at 27.
152
Camacho, Mustering II, supra note 76, at 329-30.
153
See Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 12, at 12-14.
154
Camacho, Mustering II, supra note 76, at 287.
155
JOHN FORESTER, THE DELIBERATIVE PRACTITIONER: ENCOURAGING
PARTICIPATORY PLANNING PROCESSES 3 (1999). Cf. Musil, supra note 58, at 831 (“In the
150
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to facilitate a scoping process to determine the degree of
participation in the negotiations that would best serve the
interests of the full range of possible stakeholders.156 Then, if
appropriate, the planning official would provide resources and
facilitate negotiations, rather than being placed in the
impossible role of mandating the public interest (under the
unilateral model) or serving as the sole negotiator on behalf of
many diverse interests (under the bilateral model). Such a
community scoping process would resemble a common
community-organizing process used in CBAs, where local groups
explore the goals and resource capacity of stakeholders.157
Crucially, however, local government officials would facilitate
and mediate discussions on the range of stakeholderrepresentation issues. If developers or other stakeholders are
unwilling or unable to negotiate, the municipality could
negotiate with such parties separately in order to gather
information about potential effects and alternatives, assess
interests, develop terms and conditions, formulate development
plans, and potentially execute agreements.158
Though of course the efficacy of a multilateral approach
is inevitably context-specific, studies in dispute resolution
suggest that multilateral approaches to public policy dispute
resolution tend to be more effective in circumstances in which
disputes are more concrete, involve a manageable number (and
fewer diffuse) stakeholders, and agreement implementation
largely depends on the participants and groups they
represent.159 In such circumstances, participation is more likely
to be less costly and more convenient, stakeholders tend to
have powerful incentives to resolve disputes because
relationships are more likely to be long term, and agreements
will tend to be easier to enforce and implement. Unlike

Unites States, local development officials mediate the relationships between business
controls of development economic functions and public controls of development
incentives and approvals.”).
156
Camacho, Mustering II, supra note 76, at 280.
157
Beach, supra note 36, at 101.
158
Community-based organizations can themselves enter into binding,
enforceable agreements with public authorities over particular development. See, e.g.,
Gross, supra note 41, at 49.
159
See, e.g., Thomas C. Beierle & Jerry Cayford, Dispute Resolution as a
Method of Public Participation, in THE PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION 53, 65 (Rosemary O’Leary & Lisa B. Bingham
eds., 2003); SUSAN L. PODZIBA, CIVIC FUSION: MEDIATING POLARIZED PUBLIC DISPUTES
(2013); LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE:
CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 77-78 (1987).
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prominent federal multilateral processes such as most
negotiated rulemakings, the disputes in local land use conflicts
tend to have these characteristics.160 Although American land
use regulatory processes remain understudied, modest
evidence suggests that using a more multilateral orientation to
resolve land use disputes can reduce costs, lead to processes
that are more widely accepted, and produce agreements that
are favored over those reached under the conventional bilateral
approach. According to “[t]he only broad[ly] published study of
the burgeoning use of collaborative land use agreements to
date—a study that examined land use mediation processes—
. . . ninety-one percent of participants, including government
officials, reported that the process cost less . . . than more
adversarial, conventional alternatives.”161 Additionally, “eightyfive percent [of participants reported] that the process took less
time . . . .”162 Perhaps most importantly, however, the vast
majority of participants were satisfied with their mediated
collaborative process and preferred the negotiated outcome to
the standard decision-making process.163 Even where the
collaborative process did not result in a final agreement, almost
two-thirds of participants who viewed their dispute as
unresolved thought that the mediated multilateral process
helped the parties make significant progress.164
CONCLUSION
Integrating a more multilateral and adaptive model into
the development and agreement process promotes the
legitimacy of public land use governance. Indeed, this model
addresses the biggest critiques of the conventional bilateral

160

See Camacho, Mustering II, supra note 76, at 322-24 (“There are fewer
logistical and organizational obstacles to collaborative approaches in the local land use
context than there are in administrative law disputes.”).
161
Id. at 307. The study “examined land use mediation processes.” Id.
162
Id.; cf. Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the
Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60, 121 (2000) (The value of newly acquired
information on the positions of other affected parties, for example, may extend beyond
any particular rulemaking); Laura I. Langbein & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Regulatory
Negotiation Versus Conventional Rulemaking: Claims, Counter-Claims and Empirical
Evidence, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 599 (2000).
163
Camacho, Mustering II, supra note 76, at 310.
164
Id. at 311 (Where no agreement was ultimately reached, participants
nevertheless reported several benefits from the process: “it aided the parties in
developing the basis for future negotiations[;] expanded the available information[;]
improved stakeholder relationships through constructive dialogue[;] clarified issues
and interests[;] and increased participant confidence in government efficacy.”).
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approach. Integrating CBAs into development-agreement and
annexation-agreement frameworks would minimize the costs
from the redundancy of multiple parallel processes, and it
would enable local authorities to promote agreements that
better reflect the full range of affected parties. The multilateral
model also places the government in the more appropriate and
effective role of managing and facilitating stakeholder
representation, which nurtures a more engaged civic culture by
incentivizing participation within affected communities.165 By
enabling affected parties to participate directly in and shape
the democratic process, the multilateral model engages and
helps cultivate a local government’s most distinctive and
essential source of legitimacy.166
There undoubtedly are challenges with a reliance on a
more multilateral model as the basis for land use decision
making. These include the difficulties of promoting effective
stakeholder
representation,
minimizing
the
potential
unwieldiness of a multilateral process, and overcoming selfinterested behavior by local interests.167 Nonetheless, one of the
key advantages of a multilateral regulatory design is that it can
make addressing these concerns regarding the relationship
among stakeholders, and between stakeholders and regulators,
the focus of governance.168 Ultimately, by empowering and
encouraging community participation, a multilateral model
would more likely produce agreements that are fairer, more
effective, and broadly accepted. It also would provide a process
that is more congruent with modern planning and governance
theory than either the initial unilateral model or conventional
bilateral model, even as supplemented by CBAs.169

165
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Id. at 284.
Rose, supra note 27, at 887; see also Camacho, Mustering II, supra note 76, at

277, 327.
167

Though only briefly identified here due to the more truncated symposium
format, these and other potential concerns are considered in more detail at Camacho,
Mustering II, supra note 76, at 306-22.
168
Id. at 314-15.
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Rose, supra note 27, at 887.
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